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courts interpret this prong; and part III revisits the plain language of the Brunner test and discusses 
how dicta has subsumed this language, thereby making it very a high burden for debtors to meet. 
I. The Brunner Test 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established a three-prong test 
for evaluating “undue hardship” claims in Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp.4 Under 
this test, a debtor must prove: 
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and 
expenses, a “minimal standard of living for herself and her 
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional 
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to 
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the 
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to 
repay the loans.5 
The high burden required by this test is reasonable in light of the “clear congressional intent 
exhibited in section 523(a)(8) to make the discharge of student loans more difficult than that of 
other nonexcepted debt.”6  
There is a presumption against discharging student loan debt, and the debtor has the burden 
of proof, which requires proving all three elements before a court can grant discharge.7  If the 
debtor fails to satisfy any one of the elements in the Brunner test, “the bankruptcy court’s inquiry 
must end there, with a finding of no dischargeability.”8 Additionally, the analysis under Brunner 
does not consider equitable concerns or other extraneous factors that would support a finding of 
dischargeability.9 There is no distinction between sympathetic and unsympathetic debtors, as all 
debtors are held to the same standard.10  
                                               
 831 F.2d at 395. 
5 Id. at 396. 
6 See id. 
7 See Rifino v. United States of America, et. al. (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001). 
8 See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
9 See id. at 306. 
10 See Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (Matter of Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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II. Analysis of Brunner’s Second Prong: What Additional Circumstances are Necessary to 
Demonstrate the Debtor’s State of Affairs are Likely to Persist for a Significant Portion 
of the Student Loans Repayment Periods? 
 
The second prong of the Brunner test has been interpreted to be a “demanding 
requirement.”11 A debtor must prove that additional circumstances exist indicating that his current 
hardships and challenges are likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period.12 
Additional circumstances are those that “impacted on the debtor’s future earning potential but 
which [were] either not present when the debtor applied for the loans or [have] since been 
exacerbated.”13 Accordingly, the dischargeability of student loans should be based upon the 
“certainty of hopelessness,” and not simply the debtor’s inability to fulfill financial commitments.14 
Thus, it is necessary for the debtor to prove “a total incapacity…in the future to pay [his] debts for 
reasons not within [his] control.”15 
a. Employment Opportunities 
A debtor will be unable to satisfy the second prong of Brunner if the debtor can obtain a 
higher paid employment position or additional steady employment.16 There is nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code that suggests a debtor may work only in a field that he was trained in, obtain a 
low-paying job in that field, and then claim it would be an undue hardship to repay his student 
loans.17 This is because it is not uncommon for individuals to take jobs outside their field of 
choosing to facilitate the repayment process.18 
For example, in Matter of Gerhardt, the court denied discharge of student loan debt 
because the debtor was capable of finding additional employment that would ease his repayment 
                                               
11 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 2005). 
12 See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
13 See United States Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (Matter of Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 2003). 
14 See Roberson v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n. (Matter of Roberson), 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993). 
15 See Matter of Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 92 (citation omitted). 
16 See id. at 93; see also In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 401. 
17See Matter of Gerhardt, 348 F.2d at 93. 
18 See In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 401. 
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process.19 The debtor held a master’s degree in music, earned less than $1,900 per month as a 
professional musician, and collected unemployment during his off seasons.20 The court recognized 
that even though it would be unlikely to obtain a higher paid position as a musician, the debtor 
was more than capable of finding additional work, such as teaching full-time, teaching at night-
school, or working as a music store clerk.21 Additionally, the court explained if this debtor could 
claim undue hardship just because he chose to work in his field which pays poorly, then all 
professional musicians would also qualify for an undue hardship discharge.22 Because the debtor 
failed to demonstrate the type of exceptional circumstances necessary to satisfy the second prong 
of Brunner, the court denied discharge of the student loan debt.23 
Similarly, in In re Frushour, the court held “[h]aving a low-paying job…does not in itself 
provide undue hardship, especially where the debtor is satisfied with the job, has not actively 
sought higher-paying employment, and has earned a larger income in previous jobs.”24 There, the 
debtor held a degree in the arts, and worked in several different areas including real estate, sales 
and restaurant management.25 At the time the debtor filed an adversary complaint to discharge her 
student loan debt, the debtor was self-employed as a decorative painter with an income of 
approximately $10,000.26 However, in her prior employment positions, the debtor was making 
double her income.27 The debtor provided no indication as to why she could not return to a similar 
type of work, nor did she try to find more lucrative work.28 And although the debtor was content 
with her low-paying position as a decorative painter, as it was her original goal to work in the arts, 
                                               
19 See Matter of Gerhardt, 348 F.2d at 92–93. 
20 Id. at 92.   
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 93. 
23 See id. 
24 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 2005). 
25 Id. at 397. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. at 401. 
28 See id. 
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the court found that insufficient to create an undue hardship.29 Thus, the court denied discharge of 
her student loan debt because the debtor could not provide any additional circumstances beyond 
the debt itself to demonstrate an undue hardship.30 
b. Temporary Hardships  
A debtor who is experiencing a temporary hardship will not satisfy the second prong of 
Brunner, and therefore will be precluded from discharging his student loan debt.31 In Matter of 
Roberson, the court denied the debtor’s request to discharge his unpaid balance of student loans 
because the debtor’s dire financial straits were only temporary.32 At the time the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy and requested a discharge of his student loan debt, the debtor had just lost his driver’s 
license due to two convictions for driving under the influence, was laid off from his job, was 
divorced, and was left unable to pay back his creditors.33 The court determined that there were 
slight prospects for employment in the near future due to the debtor’s lack of transportation, but 
the court recognized the debtor would be eligible for a new license in two years.34 Thus, these 
impediments, although dismal, would not prohibit gainful employment in the future.35 Therefore, 
the court found the debtor’s conditions would not persist for an extended period of time and denied 
discharge of his student loan debt.36  
Likewise, in Matter of Thomas, the court found the debtor’s present inability to pay her 
student loan debt would not persist throughout a significant portion of the loan repayment period.37 
There, the debtor had a degenerative condition, and although she was unemployed when she filed 
                                               
29 See id. 
30 See id. at 404. 
31 See Roberson v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n. (Matter of Roberson), 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993); see 
also Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (Matter of Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2019). 
32 999 F.2d at 1132. 
33 See id. at 1133. 
34 See id. at 1134. 
35 See id. at 1137. 
36 See id. at 1137. 
37 931 F.3d at 452. 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
for discharge of her student loan debt, the court found she was capable of sedimentary employment 
at that time and in the future.38 Additionally, the debtor’s unemployment was a result of being fired 
for violating company policies, not a result of physical problems outside of her control.39 
Therefore, the court denied discharge of her student loan debt, concluding the debtor did not meet 
the undue hardship burden as her temporary circumstances were within her control.40  
III. Eluding from Dicta and Revisiting the Plain Language of the Brunner Test 
The high burden and harsh results of continuously denying discharge of student loan debt 
under the Brunner test have, in effect, flowed from other cases interpreting Brunner.41 Although 
dicta from prior decisions has subsumed the plain language of the test and have therefore made it 
a difficult burden to meet, it is in fact possible for debtors to meet the burden under Brunner.42 
Most notably, Brunner does not require a debtor to show that his circumstances will persist 
forever.43 Rather Brunner requires the debtor’s present state of affairs persist only for a significant 
portion of the repayment period.44 In considering the debtor’s state of affairs, a lengthy history of 
financial struggles may be a valid indicator of more of the same financial struggles in the future.45 
Additionally, the more time that has passed since the student loans became due, the more likely it 
is for the debtor to satisfy the second prong of Brunner.46 Finally, it is not required to determine 
                                               
38 See id. at 450.   
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 453. 
41 See Rosenberg v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp (In re Rosenberg), 610 B.R. 454, 458 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2020); see also Bukovics v. Navient (In re Bukovics), 2020 WL 949936 at 10 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020). 
42 See In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. at 457 (finding a debtor satisfied all three prongs of Brunner and therefore was 
entitled to discharge of student loan debt); see also In re Bukovics, 2020 WL 949936 at 12 (granting student loan 
discharge to a debtor who offered substantial evidence of inability to find employment and longstanding financial 
difficulties).  
43 See In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. at 458; see also In re Bukovics, 2020 WL 949936 at 9–10. 
44 See In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. at 461. 
45 See In re Bukovics, 2020 WL 949936 at 10. 
46 See id. 
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whether the debtor’s state of affairs was created by choice.47 It is only necessary to determine 
whether state of affairs exist that hinder the debtor’s ability to repay the loans.48  
CONCLUSION 
An individual debtor is entitled to discharge his or her student loan debt if he satisfies the 
“undue hardship” burden. This requires satisfaction of all three prongs of the Brunner test: the 
debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living; additional circumstances exist indicating the 
debtor’s state of affairs will persist throughout the repayment period; and the debtor has made a 
good faith effort to repay the loans. Courts have interpreted this as a very high burden to meet, but 
it is not an impossible burden. For a debtor to satisfy the second prong, it is imperative that the 
debtor makes a conscious effort to seek other employment opportunities, whether it is a higher-
paid position or an additional job. Although the debtor’s circumstances inhibiting repayment 
cannot be temporary, it is not necessary that the circumstances last forever. Rather, the debtor is 
only required to demonstrate his circumstances will persist for a significant portion of the 
repayment period.  
 
                                               
47 See In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. at 461. 
48 See id. 
